When Does a Resignation Become a Dismissal?

Lessons from Maleka v Boyce N.O. and Others [2026] ZACC 7
The Constitutional Court has recently delivered an important judgment on constructive dismissal in Maleka v Boyce N.O. and Others [2026] ZACC 7. The decision provides valuable clarity for employers, HR practitioners, executives, and employment law professionals navigating restructuring and organisational change.
The case arose after Mr. Reynolds Maleka, an IT Director at ADT Security, resigned following a corporate restructuring linked to the acquisition of ADT by Fidelity Security Group. His principal complaint was that his reporting line changed: instead of reporting directly to the Managing Director, he would report to the newly appointed Financial Director. Mr Maleka regarded this as a demotion that impaired his dignity and rendered his continued employment intolerable. He alleged that he had therefore been constructively dismissed in terms of section 186(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA).
The CCMA rejected his claim. The Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court upheld that decision. The matter ultimately reached the Constitutional Court.
Constructive dismissal is defined in section 186(1)(e) of the LRA as occurring where an employee terminates employment because the employer made continued employment intolerable. Three elements must be established: the employee must have resigned; continued employment must have been objectively intolerable; and the employer must have caused that intolerability. The burden of proof rests on the employee.
A central contribution of the Constitutional Court judgment is its reaffirmation that the threshold for intolerability is high. Intolerability does not mean frustration, disappointment, loss of prestige, or discomfort associated with corporate restructuring. It requires conduct that is objectively unbearable. In this case, Mr Maleka’s salary, title, executive committee membership, and core responsibilities remained unchanged. The Court found that the reporting line adjustment, supported by a legitimate business rationale, did not amount to an objective demotion.
Importantly, the Court emphasised that whether a dismissal occurred is a jurisdictional question. This means that on review, courts apply a correctness standard rather than the Sidumo reasonableness test. If there was no dismissal, the CCMA lacked jurisdiction from the outset. This procedural clarification is significant for review applications involving constructive dismissal claims.
The Court also underscored that constructive dismissal is a remedy of last resort. Although exhaustion of internal grievance procedures is not an inflexible prerequisite, employees are generally expected to attempt available remedies before resigning, unless doing so would clearly be futile. Mr Maleka did not formally pursue internal grievance processes or an unfair labour practice claim relating to demotion. This failure weighed against his case and reinforced the conclusion that resignation was premature.
Another notable aspect of the judgment is its treatment of anticipated intolerability. Mr Maleka’s argument rested partly on concerns about his future status and influence in the restructured organisation. The Court rejected the notion that speculative future marginalisation or anticipated loss of authority can found a constructive dismissal claim. Intolerability must exist at the time of resignation. Hypothetical future harm is insufficient.
For employers, the judgment confirms that legitimate restructuring, where remuneration and core responsibilities remain intact, will not automatically expose the organisation to constructive dismissal liability. That said, consultation and transparent communication remain essential to maintaining trust and avoiding disputes. Perception often drives litigation, even where legal thresholds are not met.
For employees, the decision serves as a caution. Constructive dismissal is difficult to prove. Courts will interrogate the objective facts closely. Resignation should not be used as a strategic shortcut where other remedies exist. Where dissatisfaction arises from structural change rather than oppressive conduct, the claim is unlikely to succeed.
For HR and employee relations practitioners, the case reinforces disciplined legal analysis. It confirms the distinction between jurisdictional review (correctness) and fairness review (reasonableness). It also limits the expansion of constructive dismissal into a general remedy for workplace dissatisfaction arising from corporate realignment.
The Court acknowledged that allegations of humiliation and impaired dignity must be taken seriously. However, dignity in the workplace is assessed objectively. Not every perceived slight or reporting change rises to the level of constitutional impairment. The employment relationship inevitably involves shifting hierarchies, performance oversight, and structural change. Labour law protects against unfairness, not against all discomfort.
The key takeaway is clear: constructive dismissal remains an exceptional remedy. Resignation must be compelled by objectively intolerable conduct attributable to the employer. Disagreement with restructuring, loss of influence, or anticipated discomfort will not suffice.
Maleka v Boyce is likely to become a leading authority in future constructive dismissal disputes and will shape how both employers and employees approach organisational restructuring going forward.


